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The Origins of Indigenism: Human Rights and the Politics of Identity. Ronald
Niezen. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. xix + 272 pp., notes,
references, index. $49.95 (cloth), $18.95 (paper). ISBN 0-520-23554-1,
0-520-23556-8. [www.ucpress.edu]
ALCIDA RITA RAMOS
University of Brasilia
Ronald Niezen defines indigenism as “a social movement with a strategic
focus outside of states that seeks to activate rights to autonomy within states”
(p. 136).  Apparently uninterested in indigenism’s national manifestations, the
author claims as his object of study “the world,” but contained in the nutshell
of the Palais des Nations in Geneva (p. 1).  He is so impressed with the actors
and their actions at the international arena of indigenous politics at the United
Nations that he contradictorily evokes Benedict Anderson’s catchy concept of
imagined communities (created to highlight the emergence of nation-states)
to imply more than can possibly be implied in the context of the periodic and
mostly episodic meetings very far away from home.  The attempted application
of Anderson’s concept in the Geneva context could not be farther from its
original context.
Throughout the book we find references to disagreements, bickering, and
other forms of dissonance among the indigenous and nonindigenous participants
in the United Nations meetings, but by and large one has the sense that there
is an underlying harmony resulting from a common cause.  Nevertheless, that
context is far from being a Turnerian manifestation of communitas where all
indigenous participants are in a blessed state of liminality.  There are significant
differences between the representatives of the various countries, if for no other
reason than the fact that each one has experienced what Ashis Nandy has
identified as the “intimate enemy” (in a book of the same name, 1983).  For
all the commonality of suffering that unites the indigenous participants, they
have coexisted for a long time with distinct nation-states and have, necessarily,
internalized much of their national ethos.  No wonder a Brazilian delegate once
complained of her discomfort with the overassertiveness of Native Americans
from the United States, who tend to dominate the discussions at the Palais des
Nations.
Without claiming originality (as his bibliography indicates), Niezen’s
somewhat repetitive text offers the reader the welcome testimony of a North
American (in its geographical rather than geopolitical sense) anthropologist
committed to and long involved with the cause of indigenous peoples, and who
sees the United Nations supranational forum as a hopeful instrument to curb
state abuses.  Nevertheless, the author seems to oscillate between two opposing
misapprehensions: on the one hand, that universalism as the underlying
logic of the United Nations will bring to indigenous peoples (via their active
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leaders) irreversible changes and a measure of inauthenticity; on the other, that
relativism, as an implicit closure of dominated cultures, will contribute to state
domination.
I see these concerns as misapprehensions because neither universalism nor
relativism exists in absolute terms or represents a major force against indigenous
rights.  While exposure to the technical, intellectual, and social apparatus of the
human rights circuit affects indigenous leaders directly involved with it, back
home their respective indigenous communities are unlikely to be influenced in
the same way.  In any case, change is something to which all peoples in the world
are fully accustomed.  Moreover, it is the humanist strength of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights that has allowed, paradoxically, indigenous
peoples to seek strategic supranational support for sanctions against abusive state
measures.  Regardless, it is the insistence on relativism that provides indigenous
peoples with the assurance that their ways of life will not the judged by external
parameters.  As Todorov has proposed in Nous et les autres: la réflexion française
sur la diversité humaine (1983), ideologically laden notions such as universalism
and relativism should be taken not as fixed categories, but rather as strategic
devices for specific courses of action.  The best evidence that such strategy
works are the successful outcomes accomplished by indigenous peoples at the
United Nations, such as those mentioned in Niezen’s book (p. 186).
In other words, The Origins of Indigenism owes its readers a deeper and more
refined analysis of the contrasting worldviews that inform both the universal
presuppositions inherent in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the logic of each distinct indigenous people whose sociocultural integrity is put
under the umbrella of the United Nations.  The stereotyped characterizations in
this book of thinkers such as Boas, Lévy-Bruhl, and Morgan (p. 101), besides
revealing a poor reading of these classics of anthropology, fail to advance
the quest for a lucid appraisal and understanding of an issue as complex as
international indigenism.
A fine point in Niezen’s assessment of the generalized adoption of the
term “indigenous peoples” is his distinction between “ethnonationalism” and
“indigenism,” between peoples who have emerged from recently decolonized
countries and peoples who suffered the often genocidal consequences
of the colonial powers in the Americas and Oceania.   A key feature that
distinguishes the two modes of nonconformism is a quest of secession, for while
ethnonationalists fight to gain independence from oppressive states, indigenous
peoples struggle to regain what they have lost rather than to gain what they
have never had and probably do not want, i.e., statehood.
Despite the author’s assertion that he wants to study “the world,” he is at
his best when he brings up the poignant cases of the Canadian Crees and the
African Tuareg.  There is, after all, something to be said for the anthropologist’s
ability to engage in intimate relationships with cultures not his own.
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